Extract:  Letter from Bruce Clark, Re Legal Issues
August 8, 1995


Staff Sergeant M.P. Sarich
NCO-in-Charge
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Box 37
100 Mile House, British Columbia
V0K 2E0

Re:  Tamanawas Site

Dear Sir:

   I act as legal counsel for the Indians "Percy", "Doc", "Jones" and others 
making a stand at the "Tamanawas" sacred site near Hundred Mile House in 
northern British Columbia.  Last night my clients telephoned me to explain 
their connection with peace officers under your command.  I had just returned 
from Europe where, having virtually exhausted domestic remedies on this 
continent, I have been attempting on my clients' behalf to gain a judicial 
investigation of the law upon which they rely.  They tell me that your 
officers have asked them for proof that I am indeed acting as on their behalf,
and for some explanation or justification of the legal basis for their stand.
I am anxious to comply.  My clients and I are as concerned as your officers
to uphold the law, and we no less than them to avoid bloodshed.  We are, 
nonetheless, prepared to have our lives forfeited in the process of doing 
our duty as existing law defines it.
   It is my carefully considered opinion, based upon 23 years legal 
specialization including a masters degree and a doctorate directly on point,
that your officers' duty, my clients' duty and my duty is one and the same Ñ 
to respect and to defend the rule of law.  The law itself is clear and plain. 
It is as indicated in the accompanying documents recording pending legal 
proceedings.  In a nutshell, the invasion of the Americas which began in 
earnest subsequent to 1492 occurred under the auspices of the rule of law 
rather than of war.  Upon discovering that the jurisprudential basis of the 
indigenous legal systems of the Americas is respect, the European legal 
systems met respect with respect.  The Gus-wen-tah or Iroquois wampum belt 
symbolically records the emergent social compact, depicting two parallel 
cultures coexisting in a relationship of peace, friendship and mutual respect 
for the otherÕs unrelinquished sovereignty.  The papal bull Sublimus Dens, 
1537 statutorily confirms this natural law basis for the invasion of the 
Americas, upon the premise that the Indians are human beings with souls and 
hence with the inherent right of jurisdiction over their unceded territories.  
This founding natural law principle was later universally recognized and 
affirmed as the basis for the statutory international law and constitutional 
law: New Laws for the Government of the Indies & the Preservation of the 
Indians, 1543 (Spain), article 7; Treaty of Capitulation of New France at 
Montreal, 1760 (France), article 40; Royal Proclamation of 1763 (U.K.), 
paragraph 1 of part II and paragraphs 1-6 of part IV, Royal Regulation of 
1772 (Spain), article 6; and Treaty of Cession of Russian-America, 1867 
(Russia), articles 1 and 6.  Chief Justice Marshall of the United States 
Supreme Court in the constitutive common law case of first instance Worcester 
v. Georgia, 6 Peters US Supreme Court 515, 542 (1832) reiterated:

   America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by 
   a distinct people divided into separate nations, independent of each 
   other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, 
   and governing themselves by their own laws.  It is difficult to 
   comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter 
   of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the 
   inhabitants of the other, or over the lands that they occupied; or 
   that the discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer 
   rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing 
   rights of its ancient possessors....  The great maritime powers of 
   Europe discovered and visited different parts of this continent at 
   nearly the same time.  The object was too immense for any of them 
   to grasp the whole; and the claimants were too powerful to submit 
   to the exclusive and unreasonable pretensions of any single potentate.  
   To avoid bloody conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to 
   acknowledge, and which would decide their respective rights as between 
   themselves.  This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because 
   it was in the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation 
   making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right 
   of acquiring the soil and of making settlement on it.  It was an 
   exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among 
   those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous 
   rights of those who had not agreed to it.  It regulated the right 
   given by discovery among the European discoverers, but could not 
   affect the rights of those already in possession, either as 
   aboriginal occupants, or as occupants before the memory of man.  
   It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that 
   right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.

Until the sale event has occurred natural law, international law and 
constitutional law are unanimous on the crucial point of law:Ñjurisdictional 
entry by domestic government officials onto the IndiansÕ yet unsold lands 
is illegal; and, indeed, constitutes the crimes of "Fraud" by "Pretence" 
and of "Misprision of Treason" within the meaning of those terms as used 
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
The dilemma whose horns threaten to impale my clients and I arises because 
the said crimes of fraud and treason have become the norm rather than 
exception.  Without either first or subsequently changing the previously 
established law, crown government officials jurisdictionally have entered and
occupied the Indians' yet unsold Hunting Grounds.  (It is precisely to 
legitimize that illegal event that the attempt belatedly is now being made 
to make treaties in British Columbia relative to those portions of the 
province previously omitted from the treaty-making process.)  Not only have 
crown officials prematurely and hence fraudulently and treasonably entered 
and occupied the Hunting Grounds but they have in addition purported in turn 
to sell portions to third parties.  One such third party appears to be the 
cattleman Mr. James who I am told asserts that some form of crown permission 
authorizes him to eject my clients from their "Tamanawas" site upon yet unsold
Hunting Grounds, so that he can either put his cattle there or use it for such 
other purposes as he sees fit.  Furthermore I am told that some one or more 
local band councils incorporated under the Indian Act of Canada to some extent 
support the claim that Mr. James, in opposition to the conflicting position 
occupied by my clients.  These events cast over the above mentioned dilemma 
the additional specter of the international law crime against humanity of 
"complicity in genocide" within the meaning article III(e) of the Convention 
for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.
   The "Tamanawas" ceremony genocidally (in addition to fraudulently and 
treasonably) was declared to be criminal by an amendment to the Canadian 
Indian Act enacted by An Act further to amend "The Indian Act, 1880, STATUTES 
OF CANADA 1884," chapter 27.  As amended the said Indian Act, 1880 specifically 
provided:

   Section 3.  Every Indian or other person who engages in or assists in 
   celebrating the Indian festival known as the "Potlach" or in the Indian 
   dance known as the "Tawanawas" is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be 
   liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months nor less 
   than two months in any gaol or other place of confinement; and any 
   Indians or other person who encourages, either directly or indirectly, 
   an Indian or Indians to get up such a festival or dance, or to celebrate 
   the same is guilty of a like offence, and shall be liable to the same 
   punishment.

In order for you to appreciate the full significance of that particular 
provision it is necessary for you to appreciate the larger legislative 
scheme of which it is an integral part.  The legislative intent is apparent 
when the quoted section is read in conjunction with the following additional 
section in the same statute:

   Section 72.  Whenever the Governor in Council deems it advisable for 
   the good government of a band to introduce the election system of 
   chiefs, he may by Order in Council provide that he chiefs of any band 
   of Indians shall be elected, as hereinafter provided, at such time and 
   place as the Superintendent-General may direct; and they shall, in 
   such case, be elected for a period of three years, unless deposed 
   by the Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, immorality or incompetency;...;
   Provided always, that all life chiefs now living shall continue to hold the 
   rank of chief until death or resignation, or until their removal by the 
   Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, immorality or incompetency; Provided 
   also, that in the event of His Excellency ordering that the chiefs of a band 
   shall be elected, then and in such case the life chiefs shall not exercise 
   the powers of chiefs unless elected under such order to the exercise of 
   such powers.

When you read the two quoted sections in relation to each other it is apparent
that the legislative intent is to implement the policy avowed by the Canadian 
Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald, as appears in the following Return to 
an Order of the House of Commons dated May 2, 1887 (20h) at 37:

   the great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal 
   system and to assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the 
   other inhabitants of the Dominion, as speedily as they are fit for 
   the change.

The precise manner in which that particular political intent legislatively has 
been fostered is epitomized by the two quoted sections of the Indian Act, 
1880, that is, by creating an Indian elective system which, being modeled upon 
non-native municipal government structures, exercises delegated and therefore 
controlled powers, to supersede the Indians' own previously established 
traditional "life" chief system.  The problem, from Sir John's perspective at 
least, with the traditional system is that the powers it exercises are 
inherent and unrestricted rather than delegated and restricted, and therefore 
less amenable to control by the Canadian government as the delegater.  
The problem with Sir John's perspective, from my clients' perspective at 
least, is that sections 3 and 72 of the merely domestic law Indian Act, 
1880 are in breach of the previously established and paramount natural law, 
international law and constitutional law which confirms, as the Royal 
Proclamation reiterates, that prior to the sale by them to the crown of their 
lands:

   it is just and reasonable and essential to our Interest and the 
   Security of our Colonies that the several Nations or Tribes of 
   Indians with whom We are connected and who live under out 
   Protection should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession 
   of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as not having 
   been ceded to or purchased by Us are reserved for them or any 
   of them as their Hunting Grounds.

In order better to ensure respect for the law against crown officials whose 
personal interest in occupying the Indians' Hunting Grounds would conflict 
with their legal duty to apprehend and punish such occupation, the said 
proclamation therefore went on expressly to criminalize breaches by crown 
officials of that duty.  Thus it enacts:

   no Governor or Commander in Chief...do presume upon any Pretence 
   whatever to grant Warrants of Survey or pass any Patents of Land...
   upon any Lands whatever which not having been ceded to or purchased 
   by Us as aforesaid are reserved to the said Indians or any of 
   them...And We do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons 
   whatever who have either wilfully or inadvertently seated 
   themselves...upon any Lands which not having been ceded to or 
   purchased by Us are still reserved to the said Indians as aforesaid 
   forthwith to remove themselves from such Settlements...And whereas 
   great Frauds and Abuses have been committed...if at any Time any of 
   the said Indians shall be inclined to dispose of the said Lands the 
   same shall be purchased only for Us in our Name at some Public 
   Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians to be held for that Purpose 
   by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony respectively 
   within which they shall lie...And we do further expressly enjoin 
   and require all Officers whatever as well Military as those Employed 
   in the Management and Direction of Indian Affairs within the 
   Territories reserved as aforesaid for the use of the said Indians 
   to seize and apprehend all Persons whatever who standing charged 
   with Treason Misprisions of Treason Murders or other Felonies or 
   Misdemeanors shall fly from Justice and take Refuge in the said 
   Territory and to send them under a proper guard to the Colony where 
   the Crime was committed of which they stand accused in order to take 
   their Trial for the same.

My clients and I read those passages as indicating that the only time the 
police have jurisdiction in relation to yet unpurchased lands is when they are
apprehending non-native fugitives who have fled to the Hunting Grounds so as 
to claim sanctuary on territory that for all other purposes is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the domestic crown governments and their courts.  Grants to 
third parties are illegal, so therefore the police can not be present to 
protect third party rights under grants.  Settlement by third parties 
constitutes trespass, and removal is no less mandatory just because the 
settlement may be innocent or inadvertent.  The domestic crown governments, 
their courts, their police and their citizens have at all material times been 
on notice that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
In spite of that clear, plain and paramount law Canada no only domestically 
enacted sections 3 and 72 of the Indian Act, 1880 but, taking a step 
criminally beyond its powers, applied those sections to the yet unpurchased 
Hunting Grounds.  Those sections legitimately can only be applied to lands 
that have been purchased by the crown from the Indians. Indeed, the legal 
point of the treaty process is to extinguish the Indians' natural law, 
international law and constitutional law right of jurisdiction that otherwise 
is not supposed to be "molested or disturbed" by domestic crown governments, 
their courts or their police.  The essential point of the existing natural 
law, international law and constitutional law is that domestic law sections 
like 3 and 72 (or any other sections of the Indian Act) may not legally be 
applied to yet unsold Hunting Grounds which lands, aside from the one express 
exception concerning fugitives, by legal definition are beyond the 
jurisdictional reach of domestic crown governments, their courts and their 
police.  The reference here to "the courts" is crucial.  As you can see from
the enclosed Supreme Court of Canada application dated JuneÊ28, 1995 the 
relevant constitutive common law case of first instance, Mohegan Indians v.
Connecticut, which was decided b Queen Anne in 1704 and confirmed by the Privy 
Council as an appellate tribunal in 1773, ruled that the Indians do not have 
to attorn to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of the domestic crown 
governments with which the Indians jurisdictionally are in competition.  
The problem presently being faced by my clients and I, and now by you and 
your officers, is that the domestic courts in Canada simply refuse to address 
the Mohegan case.
	Ever since sections 3 and 72 of the domestic Indian Act, 1880 implemented 
by Sir John A. Macdonald's genocidal policy of forced assimilation by falsely 
criminalizing the life chief system, the domestic courts of Canada have been 
suborned by the domestic crown government and their collaborating Indian Act 
elective system into assuming jurisdiction over yet unsold Hunting Grounds.  
I use the word "genocidally" advisedly, in its strictest legal sense.  Articles 
II(b) and (c) of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, 1948 define "genocide" as follows:

    In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
    committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
    ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
    (b)  Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
    (c)  Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
    to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

Sir John A. Macdonald's policy of assimilation was formulated "with intent to 
destroy" that particular "part" of Indian society that constitutes a distinct 
"national, ethnical, racial or religious group", to terminate that particular 
"part" of Indian society which, by insisting upon the life chief system, is 
identifiable as a distinct "national, ethnical, racial and religious group."  
The means of implementation of the genocidal policy was, and remains, the 
premature, meaning prior to treaty, and hence treasonable and fraudulent, 
establishment of illegal band council governments under the domestic Indian 
Act, coupled with the enabling invasion of the Indians' yet unsold Hunting 
Grounds by domestic crown governments, courts and police.  This brings us 
full circle to the point with which this report to you began: the 
"explanation or justification of the legal basis for their stand."  My 
clients and I believe and contend that it is a legal duty to resist treason 
and fraud of genocidal consequence.  Furthermore, we submit to you that this 
duty binds you no less than it does us.  The fact that the crimes are 
fostered by the Governor General of Canada, the Prime Minister of Canada and 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and that all the other 
juridical institutions in Canadian society are accomplices, does not change 
the law.  Nor does it lessen the need to apprehend the crimes.  Articles IV 
and VI of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1948 enact:

   Article IV.  Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts 
   enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are 
   constitutionally rulers, public officials or private individuals.
   
   Article VI.  Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
   enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of 
   the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such 
   international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to 
   those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

My clients and I now turn to you, the police, for protection against a legal 
establishment that in willful blindness has set its face against the rule of 
law.  There is no middle ground.  You may choose just to follow orders that 
are criminal or, alternatively, to defend the rule of law against those 
orders.  You can exercise the latter option by writing to me that you will 
not physically seek to enforce domestic legislation and domestic court 
decrees against my clients in relation to their "Tamanawas" site until such 
time as an "international penal tribunal" within the meaning the above quoted 
article VI has adjudicated the validity of the accusation made herein.  I am 
not ashamed to beg you to take this extraordinary step, for if you do it may 
set in motion a course of events that culminates in the final triumph of the 
rule of law over the scourge of genocide. ....

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